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PAPERWISE, INC., fka : 
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY 
INC, a corporation, : TO DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES' 
BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. 
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON & 
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership, : 
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, Case No. 20010888-CA 
an individual. : 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
ARGUMENT 
All references are to the Court Record "R" with the exception of references to 
Defendants/Appellees' Brief "DB" 
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT NO GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AND, IN FACT, ACKNOWLEDGES THE 
EXISTENCE OF NUMEROUS SUCH ISSUES, THUS DEMONSTRATING THAT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE. 
Point I: Defendants/Appellees' own arguments expressly acknowledge the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact. 
"To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and 
inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the [non-moving] party, must show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the [moving] party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Judkins v. Toone. 492 P.2d 980 (Utah 1972). Weighed 
against this well-established standard, the arguments presented in Defendants' Brief are 
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certainly curious. Indeed, one of the Defendants' primary arguments against affecting the 
grant of summary judgment is that the Plaintiff has "ignore[d] facts that are established by 
deposition testimony and discovery." DB9. This is precisely Plaintiffs point: the parties 
disagree as to some of the basic facts of the case. Although the word "disputed" would be 
more accurate than the word "ignored" in this instance, the Plaintiff agrees with the thrust 
of Defendants' statement; the Plaintiff has not seen fit to merely accept the Defendants' 
version of the relevant events, but instead has actively asserted a substantially different 
version of the facts. The Plaintiff, furthermore, has not merely rested on its assertions and 
allegations, but has entered evidence, including expert testimony, in support of its 
position. Defendants, in turn, clearly disagree with Plaintiff's position, as is their right to 
do so. This creates a factual dispute that the Plaintiff seeks to have adjudicated before a 
fact-finder. Indeed, there can be little doubt at this point that there is a factual dispute 
between Plaintiff and Defendants as to whether Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s 
reliance and whether Plaintiff suffered damages as the result of Defendants' acts. No 
further showing is required at this stage of the proceedings; the Plaintiff, who does not yet 
have to prove that it will prevail at trial, shoulders the lesser burden of submitting 
evidence sufficient to show that trial is necessary. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Cosntructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In order for the non-moving party 
to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and sent the issue to a fact-finder, 
it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-
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moving party to show facts controverting the facts stated in the moving party's 
affidavit5'). In similar fashion, the trial judge, when considering a motion for summary 
judgment, is prohibited by law from weighing the evidence and assessing credibility at 
that point. Truiillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("Trial 
courts must avoid weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on summary 
judgment"). The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, is sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact in that reasonable minds could differ as to 
knowledge on the part of Defendants and to damages on the part of Plaintiff. Thus, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Point II: Plaintiff has submitted admissible evidence as to whether 
Defendants/Appellees were aware of Plaintiff/Appellant would be 
relying on the 1993 TKI audit, thus creating a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
The balance of Defendants' arguments concern the notion that Plaintiffs evidence 
is unsupported by the record. DB9-10. Defendants rely on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e) and Utah Rule of Evidence 602 to support the proposition that Curtis Bramble's 
affidavits are inadmissible on the ground that he does not possess personal and 
independent knowledge of the relevant facts. DB11-12. These rules do not support 
Defendants' position. Defendants fail to quote the final part of Utah Rule of Evidence 
602, which states the "rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703
 5 relating to opinion 
testimony by expert witnesses." Rule 703, in turn, reads in relevant part as follows: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
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inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 703 (1992, as amended). Thus, contrary to Defendants' 
assertions, there is absolutely no requirement that Curtis Bramble, an expert witness for 
the Plaintiff, possess any independent knowledge of the facts of the case. It is of no 
import that Bramble was neither an officer, director or participant in the Paperwise 
acquisition, nor that he was not involved in the Defendants' audit. It is entirely 
acceptable that Bramble based his testimony of the Defendants' negligence on relevant 
audit documents and that are central to this litigation. The evidentiary value of Bramble's 
expert testimony cannot be discounted merely because he was not directly involved with 
the relevant events of the case. 
Defendants then proceed to argue that Plaintiff and/or Bramble have fabricated 
numerous facts to support their statements. Neither Plaintiff nor Bramble has fabricated 
any facts. Each of the alleged fabrications shall be addressed in turn. 
Defendants first challenge Bramble's opinion that the audit was not complete until 
June 20, stating that it "ignores the deposition testimony of Appellee Jones on pages 54-
55 attached as Exhibit 'A' to JJOC's Motion for Summary Judgment which shows that 
the field work was completed on May 3, 1993, and the full written audit report was issued 
on May 17, 1993." DB12. If anything, it is this statement, not Bramble's opinion, that is 
7 
not born out by subsequent events that even the Defendants have acknowledged. There 
can be no question that tiu . defendants, even aftei the i elease of the supposedly comp lete 
nfilil . -ii M.n I"' l''lM \]\{\ .'OMl'fiiL (n research and analyze TKI's business 
engagements, resulting in the addition of several footnotes to the May 1 ~ ;mdit. This fact 
is not harmonious with the notion that the Ma> * audit was perfectly complete. 4ot 
lack of financial documents or the auditor's report, the 1993 TKI audit was not, m fact, 
complete until the addition of the final footnote, Footnotr 11, on June 30, 1993. ^h^ 
testimony is not based on speculation ^ •-. • - i .; .- i 
< ^ hi. b ;;IH subsequent period" following the issuing of balance sheets to 
allow the accountants to "perform certain audit procedures for transactions or events 
occurring after the balance-sheet date." Bramble First Affidavit §8, R^8x quoting 
lawsuit, Footnote 11, is in fact identified as a "subsequent event" by its own heading. 
Thus, Plaintiff has taken a fair and reasonable position that is based upon not only 
the record. Defendants contend that this position "totally ignores the Statement of 
Auditing Standard (SAS) #1," but it must be noted that they fail to either cite to the 
location of v \> -•; .;. the record or i nclude the eritii e . .: -. SAS #1 in theii Brief '. 
DB1 3 I o c ne 1 'lai iitttf s knowledge, th is i s the fi rs11 *».* :nai Defendant has introduced 
8 
and relied upon this statute. As Plaintiff is unable to locate the full text of AU Section 
530.01-530.02 in either the record index or in Defendants' Brief, it cannot adequately 
respond to this supposed conflict at this time. However, it must be noted that the portion 
of SAS #1 cited by Defendants states that "generally the date of the completion of the 
field work should be used as the date of the independent auditor's report." DB13 
(emphasis added). Clearly, there are exceptions to this rule. It cannot therefore be 
assumed that the AU standards upon which Plaintiff and Bramble rely are in conflict with 
SAS #1; it is entirely conceivable that an exception exists where even if the field work 
had been completed on May 3, 1993, thai date would not stand as the date the auditor's 
report had been completed. This would, in fact, provide additional support for Bramble's 
testimony stating that in spite of the fact that the field work had all been completed on 
May 3,1993, the audit was not yet perfectly complete. Even assuming that there is a 
conflict between two AU standards, Defendants have failed to give any reason as to why 
SAS #1 must prevail. The Defendants have made no showing that they are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on this point, as they are required to do. Defendants have 
done nothing more than state that, in light of this apparent conflict, the Plaintiff is wrong 
for having "ignored" SAS #1 in favor of AU standard section 560.10. Thus, Defendants 
cannot persuasively argue that there is no foundation for Bramble's testimony relating 
either to the date the audit was completed or to other matters upon which he has offered 
his professional opinion. 
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Defendants also argue that Plaintiff makes inappropriate use of Jones' f 
Deposition taken i n a different case in I exas Defendants state that the diffei eiice 
between the issues in that case and the issues in the instant case are significant enough to 
warrant denying the use of the 1994 answers in this matter. There is, however, no 
evidence of any differences or sin n ianlit/s IM.imtiff rjmnnl ir-fm aiuuim m 
because Defendants do not cite to any specific documents in the record other than the 
deposition itself and have failed to include any such documents in their Brief. As a result, 
Plaintiff has no knowledge of how similar the two bodies of litigation are, and ai e 
answer in Jones' 1994 deposition that Plaintiff relies on in the instant case: the answer to 
a question about when Jones first learned of the proposed acquisition. J his question, 
though posed tu» Jmiib in J l*w-l tlcpi IM( i< HI H dHTetnif l.iwmni w\v> simple HI.MI .iml 
straightforward Jones was asked, "Do your time records indicate when you had your 
first discussions with Keith Pope about Note -"n" RQSR, Footnote 11 is the audit 
footnote confirming that 1 Ivl would >»HI il* ais^i^ m riipunisi luii^ iLspomlul I IL 
in nqi lii ] - affiimatrv el> R 958 Asked for the exact date, Jones responded, "May 28, 1993." 
R958. There is nothing unclear or potentially duplicitous about this exchange, nor is 
response of a complexity that would require some attempt at interpretation in riaintili, 
Vskeill " lieu lit1 fiisl k anted nf llir I1\ I ,ii'qutsi(toti, Jnnirs \)\n\ nlcil tin IIJIIC d( Mav 28, 
1993. There is no possibility of mistake, misuse, or of the answer being taken out of 
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context. This is the only part of Jones' 1994 deposition that is relevant to the instant case, 
and is the only part of the deposition thai Plaintiff relies on. This reliance is not 
unreasonable. Without waiving the right to demonstrate the Defendants first learned of 
the acquisition even earlier than May 28, 1993, Plaintiff must not be prevented from 
citing to Jones' sworn answer as the latest date by which Jones and the Defendants first 
learned of Paperwise's proposed acquisition of TKI's assets. 
In sum, Plaintiff has cited to admissible deposition testimony in addition to 
admissible expert testimony for the purpose of disputing Defendants' factual allegations. 
Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. 
Point III: There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Plaintiff/Appellant suffered any damages as the result of 
Defendants/Appellees' negligence in preparing the audit. 
Defendants apparently raise no new issues regarding damages. Defendants' sole 
argument on this issue from the beginning of this litigation has been that Plaintiff could 
not have suffered damages if the misclassified TAP account receivable was never 
transferred to Plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, raises no new arguments on this issue. 
Plaintiff simply maintains that it was damaged precisely because the account receivable 
was never transferred to Plaintiff as expected. Plaintiff, relying on Defendants' erroneous 
audit and believing the TAP obligation to be an actual account receivable, expected to 
acquire assets with a substantially greater value than were actually received. They were 
surprised when they did not receive the full value of the assets that they had bargained 
n 
for, and later attempted to mitigate their damages by reclaiming that stock that they would 
not otherwise have paid in consideration for TKI's assets. This did not, however, fully 
mitigate the damages inflicted by Defendants because Plaintiff has been damaged in ways 
that are not reflected merely by the supposed value of the TAP obligation itself. This is 
not unexpected. It is simply unrealistic to argue that the misrepresentation of the value of 
assets involved in an asset acquisition will not cause harm to one or more of the parties 
involved. Statutory law and case law aside, this result is dictated by simple common 
sense. Plaintiff have entered sufficient evidence to show that they suffered damages as 
the direct result of Defendants' actions. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff raised insufficient 
evidence in opposing Defendants9 motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did, in fact, 
enter credible and reliable evidence against Defendants. This evidence tends to establish 
that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s planned acquisition of TKI's assets, and that 
Plaintiff was damaged by Defendants' negligence in preparing the audit upon which 
Plaintiff subsequently relied in contemplation of the acquisition. The trial court, which 
under law was not permitted to assess credibility and weigh evidence, did precisely that 
and granted summary judgment to Defendants in error. The grant of summary judgment 
to Defendants must therefore be reversed. 
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DATED this __^ day of July, 2002. 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Young, Kester & Petro 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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